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Abstract
The mainstream literature on monetary policy games under output persistence posits that:
a) monetary regimes do not affect real variables in the steady state; b) optimal institutional
design should entirely remove the inflation bias.  We show that neither result necessarily
holds if output persistence originates from debt dynamics and distortionary taxation. First,
monetary delegation induces a strategic use of debt policy affecting steady-state
distortions. Second, the reduction of such distortions may require monetary institutions
that tolerate an inflation rate above the socially optimal level.
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1. Introduction
It is often argued that inflation has a fiscal root. Empirical research in fact identifies optimal
tax considerations as a determinant of inflation differences across countries (Campillo and Miron,
1996). Furthermore, an important strand of the literature sees distortionary taxes as the source of
time-inconsistency in the conduct of monetary policy (Alesina and Tabellini, 1987). Therefore, one
may ask why the recent debate on monetary institutions  ￿ i.e. the controversy between
performance-based contracts  à la Walsh and weight conservatism  à la  Rogoff  ￿ has so far
neglected the consequences of debt policy for institutional design (Walsh, 1995; Svensson, 1997;
Muscatelli, 1998).
The answer probably is that models describing the interdependence  between fiscal and
monetary policy do not provide a convincing characterisation of the economy in steady state, either
because the policymakers’ time horizon is arbitrarily shortened or because obtained outcomes are
counterfactual. For instance, the strategic interdependence between the fiscal policymaker and the
central bank is sometimes addressed within a two-period framework (Beetsma and Bovenberg 1997,
1999a,b). Alternatively, the work by Jensen (1994) extends the Alesina and Tabellini (1987) model
to the case of debt accumulation within an infinite-horizon framework. He argues that inflation is a
temporary phenomenon because in steady state re-invested budget surpluses will earn the income
required to completely finance the public expenditure target. This, in turn, removes the need for
distortionary sources of revenue
1. Unfortunately empirical evidence suggests that governments are
apparently unwilling to accumulate such large surpluses.
                                                       
1 Obstfeld (1991) and Van der Ploeg (1995) obtain a similar result using different models.3
In this paper we present a modified version of the Jensen’s model, where it is assumed that
political incentives bias the policymaker’s preferences against a policy of debt reduction. By doing so
we obtain a more realistic description of the long-run relationship between debt and inflation,
showing that positive levels of both variables may persist in the steady state. We also identify the
optimal monetary policy rule in response to supply shocks, challenging the results obtained in
popular models where output exhibits persistence. For instance, Svensson (1997) shows that output
persistence induces the policymaker to accept higher inflation volatility in order to limit the
additional future effects of current supply shocks. Hence the optimal inflation response is larger
when such persistence factors are accounted for. Svensson’s argument is reversed in our model,
because we derive persistence from the intertemporal redistribution of tax distortions induced by the
debt policy. In this case, debt policy spreads over time the burden of adjustment, reducing the
optimal volatility of inflation relative to the case where persistence is absent ￿ i.e. under a balanced
budget rule. Hence, debt-induced  intertemporal factors therefore call for a more conservative
monetary stance.
The main contribution of the paper is a reassessment of monetary regimes based on policy
delegation to an independent central bank. The literature on games between the fiscal authority and
the central bank has emphasised that delegation leads to the inefficient use of debt policy. Beetsma
and Bovenberg (1999b) show that, if the inflation target is non-contingent, the fiscal player will use
debt strategically to influence next-period inflation, while taking current inflation as given. As a
result, inflation ends up being inefficiently redistributed to the current period. Although such an
effect appears in our model as well, our conclusions are rather different. By extending the two-period
model of Beetsma and Bovenberg to an infinite horizon, we find that the “cautious” debt policy
raises the volatility of the inflation bias but has long-term beneficial effects, since distortions are
reduced in the steady state. By the same token, a further reduction in steady-state distortions may be4
achieved if the central bank’s inflation target is larger than the socially optimal inflation rate. A recent
wave of research on the effects of monetary regimes on unionised labour markets has pointed out
that conservative central banks raise wage claims if unions are inflation averse
2 (Cukierman and
Lippi, 1999;  Guzzo and  Velasco, 1999;  Lippi, 1999). We extend the same argument  to the
interaction between the central bank and an inflation averse fiscal policymaker. We also find that the
central bank implements “myopic” policy responses to shocks. This happens  because debt policy is
taken as given and the intertemporal effects of monetary policy actions are consequently ignored.
The purpose of institutional design is therefore twofold. First, it should limit fiscal distortions in
steady state. Thus, if constitutional constraints on fiscal policy cannot entirely remove fiscal
distortions, the inflation target should induce the central bank to tolerate a steady-state rate of
inflation above the socially optimal level. Second, institutional design should optimise policy
responses to shocks. We show that this requires a certain degree of weigh conservatism in the central
bank loss function.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, deriving
both the policy rules and the steady state solution in a regime of full discretion. Section 3 evaluates
the performance of alternative institutional arrangements. Section 4 concludes sketching some
possible extensions to the analysis of monetary and fiscal policies within the European Monetary
Union.
                                                       
2 For an alternative view, see Coricelli et al. (2000).5
2. The model
Let us consider the following supply function
e
t t t t t y p p e t - + + - = (1)
where output deviations from the socially optimal level,  t y , depend on distortionary taxes
3,  t t , a
shock  t e , independently distributed with zero mean and finite variance
2
e s , and inflation surprises
e
t t p p - , where 
e
t p defines expected inflation.
In each period public expenditures, Gt, are financed by means of public debt and distortionary
taxes. Hence the government budget constraint can be written as
4:
t t t t G D r D t - + + = -1 ) 1 ( (2)
where Dt denotes the stock of government debt at the end of period t and r is the real rate of
interest
5.
Let us now turn to the definition of the policymaker’s preferences. Consider the following
intertemporal loss function
6:
                                                       
3 Following Alesina and Tabellini (1987) we define t as a tax rate on the total revenue of firms.
4 All variables are normalised by non-distortionary output, as in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997).
5 To limit analytical complexities we assume that r is constant and government debt is fully indexed, as in Jensen
(1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997). The r.h.s. term of eq. (2) does not include seigniorage revenues. It is well
known that in modern economies the limited amount of domestic money holdings relative to GDP severely constrains
the possibility of raising anticipated seigniorage revenues. For sake of simplicity we therefore neglect this component
of the budget constraint. None of our results would significantly change if we modeled seigniorage revenues. The
proof of this claim is available upon request.
6 Quadratic formulations  of the loss function may look unduly restrictive. However (3) may be viewed as an
acceptable approximation to a more general utility function. With this justification, the policymaker’s loss functions is
assumed to be quadratic even in models that explicitly model the representative agent’s preferences (Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1997, 1999; Dixit and Lambertini, 2000).6
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where  b is the discount factor. The terms    ~ p ,G
~
 and  D
~
 define respectively the policymaker’s
targets for inflation, public expenditures and debt. The assumption that the loss function is quadratic
in output, expenditures and inflation is standard in the literature since the seminal contribution of
Alesina and Tabellini (1987). The inclusion of a quadratic term in debt is perhaps more controversial
and requires some discussion, although it can be found in Tabellini (1986).
The argument is better understood discussing what happens when it is postulated that  0 3 = k
and the policymaker retains full discretion in the conduct of both fiscal and monetary policy, as in
Jensen (1994). In this case re-invested budget surpluses build up a stock of negative debt in the
steady state, earning the income necessary to entirely finance the desired level of expenditures. As a
result, tax distortions and inflation disappear. Therefore, Jensen’s formulation leads to predictions
which are unable to  explain the observed persistence of debt, tax distortions and inflation in the long
run. Moreover, it is not suitable for our purposes, as we aim to investigate whether choice  of the
monetary regime affects debt and tax distortions in the steady state.
It is intuitively obvious  that Jensen’s result cannot hold if  the policymaker pursues a non-
negative debt target, as in (3).  The persistence of excessive debt levels ￿ which cause steady-state
tax distortions  ￿ has several explanations. For instance it may be seen as the consequence of
electoral competition when policymakers disagree about the composition or the level of public
expenditures (Alesina and Tabellini, 1989; Persson and Svensson 1989). Another strand of literature
emphasises the role of intergenerational conflict (Cukierman and  Meltzer, 1989). The zero-7
distortions steady state equilibrium implies that current generations bear the costs of running budget
surpluses in order to relieve future generations from the burden of  distortionary taxation. This
outcome might hold in a world where generations are altruistically linked through bequests, so that
the intertemporal distribution of deficits only responds to efficiency considerations. Yet, fiscal policy
may be biased towards excessive debt accumulation if some individuals are bequest constrained —
i.e. they would like to borrow from future generations leaving negative bequests. In fact, the public
debt policy allows bequest-constrained individuals to raise their consumption levels at the expenses
of future generations. This happens because deficits are used to subsidise the consumption of
bequest-constrained agents, whereas debt will partly substitute capital in the portfolio of non
bequest-constrained individuals.
The loss function (3) may be interpreted as follows. The target  ~ D defines the level of debt
which would emerge if non-distortionary taxes were available in a world where bequest-constrained
individuals affect politico-economic equilibria
7. Moreover,  3 k  can be interpreted as the political cost
of tolerating debt deviations from  D
~
. This is an admittedly rough-and-ready way to incorporate
adverse political incentives into the policymaker’s behaviour
8 and to  obtain the persistence of
inefficient tax distortions in steady-state equilibrium. However, even this simple modification of the
loss function is sufficient to investigate the independent effect of monetary policy delegation schemes
on such distortions.
                                                       
7 The literature sometime assumes that adverse political incentives lower the policymaker’s discount factor (Beetsma
and  Bovenberg, 1997). Making the same assumption here would not reverse the Jensen’s conclusion that fiscal
distortions are only a transitory phenomenon, unless the discount factor were so low that the dynamic system would
become unstable.
8 Extending the Cuckierman and Meltzer framework to account for distortionary taxation and time–inconsistency in
monetary policy would quickly render their model unsuitable for the analysis of monetary regimes. By the same token,
explicitly modeling electoral incentives as in Alesina and Tabellini (1988) would unnecessarily complicate the algebra
unless one made the additional assumption that central bank policies affect electoral outcomes. Exploring such an
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper.8
To close the system we need further assumptions about policy regimes. In the following
sections we model the specific features of such regimes and discuss the corresponding solutions.
3. Full discretion
In this section we discuss the case of full discretion, where the policymaker controls all policy
instruments and is unable to precommit.
3.1 Systematic policies
To sharpen the argument about the persistence of fiscal distortions in steady state, our
analysis begins applying the Jensen’s solution method to a deterministic version of our model.
Following Jensen (1994), we assume that current debt policy decisions affect the future economy,
whereas current taxes and inflation only affect the present state of the economy. The static first-order
conditions that determine taxes and inflation in each period are as follows:
0 1 = + - t t g k y (4)
( ) 0 ~
2 = - + p p t t k y (5)
where we set  ( ) G G g t t
~
- =  to simplify notation. Condition  (4) equates the marginal benefits of a
tax-financed increase in expenditures to the marginal costs of higher taxes. Condition (5) equates the
marginal costs of inflation to the perceived benefits in terms of output expansion following a
monetary surprise.
Using (1), (4), (5) and imposing the rational expectations constraint:
( ) t
e
t E p p = (6)9
 whereE defines the rational expectations operator, we obtain the open loop solutions for taxes and
inflation
9:
( ) ( ) t t g E k E
1 - = t   (7)





1 ~ - =p p
(8)
Taxes are proportional to the expenditure gap. As a result, output distortions in each period amount
to  t g k1  and inflation deviations from the optimal level are proportional to such distortions.
Let us now turn to the intertemporal first order condition for debt policy:
( ) ( ) 0 1
~
1 1 3 1 = + - - + + t t t t g E r k D D k g k b   (9)
The stock of debt carried over to the next period, Dt is set at the level
10 where the current marginal
effect of a debt increase must equal the discounted value of the marginal effects originating from the
smaller amount of resources available for public spending in the future.






The model has two solutions for the expenditure gap and the stock of debt. If the
policymaker’s discount factor is relatively low, the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied only if
fiscal policy follows a balanced-budget rule (proof in Appendix I). This trivial solution is ruled out
only if Assumption 1 holds.
                                                       
9 We introduce the expectations operator in (7) and (8) because the solutions for the deterministic model coincide with
the expected values of the solutions in the stochastic model to be discussed in section 2.2.
10 Following Jensen, Dt is a control variable, hence the transition equation does not include the state at t-1 (Jensen,
1994 p. 769). A fortiori this argument holds for the determination of Dt+1.10
Proposition 1. Tax distortions and the inflation rate are state dependent. Tax distortions and the
inflation bias  persist in steady state (Proof in Appendix I). .
The solutions for public expenditures and debt are as follows:
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where  ( ) ss t t D D d - = ,  ( ) ( ) 1
1
3 2 1 1 k
k
k
r + + + = Q b  and the subscript ss defines steady-state values.
Equation (10) defines debt dynamics, which are stable if:
( ) r + > Q 1 (14)
Assumption 2. Condition (14) holds.
Equations (12) and (13) identify the steady-state levels of debt and expenditures,  ss D  and ss g
respectively. Given assumption 2, it is easy to see that in steady state the stock of debt is positive if
D k
~
3  is sufficiently large
11. Moreover, for  0 3 > k , steady-state expenditures are always below target.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
11  If  0 k3 =  the model is unstable unless ( ) 1 r 1 > + b . In this case the only stable equilibrium implies that debt is
negative in steady state, as in Jensen (1994).11
Turning to the analysis of deviations from the steady state, the sensitivity of expenditures to
the current debt burden (eq.11) may be interpreted as follows. A change in  ( ) 1 ) 1 ( - + t d E r  must be
matched by a symmetric adjustment in the present value of current and expected primary surpluses,























1 . The term 
Q
- Q 1
 defines the proportion of the
adjustment
12 implemented immediately. Such a proportion falls with the discount factor but increases
with  3 k , since the greater aversion to the use of debt policy calls for a stronger reaction of current
expenditures. Moreover, the variation in current expenditures required to balance the intertemporal
budget constraint is inversely related to the strength of the tax response to the expenditures gap in
each period, as  measured by the term  1 k .
Substitution of (13) into (8) yields the steady-state rate of inflation:
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k
 defines the steady-state inflation bias
13. Furthermore, substitution of
(11) into (8) shows that expected inflation is state dependent and driven by debt dynamics.
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E p p (16)
2.2 Countercyclical policies
                                                                                                                                                                                       






 is a necessary condition for stability. It is interesting to observe that the stability condition
(14) can be reinterpreted as a ceiling to the proportion of adjustment shifted onto the future.
13 Since systematic monetary policies cannot affect output distortions, the first best monetary rule should induce
expectations such that  ( ) p p ~ E = .12
Proposition 2. Monetary responses to shocks affect the future state of the economy. Intertemporal
factors induce a more conservative monetary policy stance (Proof in Appendix II).
Taking into account that expected values of taxes, public expenditures and inflation are
determined according to equations (6), (11) and (16), the policy rules may be defined as follows
( ) t t t E me p p + = (17)
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) t t t t t t t E g E g k E p p e t t - + + - - = 1 (18)
( ) ( )
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t t t k
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where m  is an undetermined coefficient definin the monetary response to supply shocks.



























From equation (20) it is easy to see that unanticipated monetary policy responses to shocks
affect output and, consequently, the tax rate and debt dynamics. This result falsifies Jensen’s guess
that the future state of the economy is independent from current monetary policies. The value of  m
that minimises the policymaker’s loss function (3) is:
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= W
Equations (21) and (22) differ unless the policymaker adheres to a balanced budget, when both  W
~
and  W ˆ  converge to 1. Furthermore, since  W
~
 is inversely related to  3 k , monetary policy is
increasingly sensitive to shocks as the policymaker becomes more averse to debt volatility. Finally,
some tedious algebra shows that the monetary rule unambiguously becomes more “conservative” –
i.e.W
~
 >W ˆ  – when intertemporal effects are taken into account. If we compare equation (22) with
the limiting case of a balanced-budget rule, it is easy to see that the strength of the optimal policy
response to shocks is conditional to the proportion of adjustment the policymaker is willing to spread
onto the future.
Finally, observe that the policy responses to shocks are obtained under the assumption that
political incentives affect the policymaker’s use of debt policy. It would be straightforward to show
that when such incentives do not matter and the policymaker is identified  with the social planner ￿
i.e.  0 3 = k  ￿ the optimal monetary response becomes unambiguously more conservative.
4. Implications for institutional design
Suppose monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank, whose loss function
may be written as:14
( ) œ ß
ø
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Ø - + =
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s t+ p  is the inflation target assigned to the bank. Observe that in (23) parameter
0 > g accounts for idiosyncratic central bank aversion to inflation without necessarily implying
weight-conservatism. The policymaker and the central bank minimise (3) and (23) respectively.
 We
assume that the fiscal and monetary authorities act non-cooperatively.
Definition 1. In the game between the fiscal policymaker and the central bank, a  Markov
equilibrium is characterised by a combination of  t t t D , p , t  such that i)  t t D , t  minimise (3) taking
t p  as given; ii) t p  minimises (23) taking  t t D , t  as given.
Let us start with the analysis of monetary policy. By taking debt as given, the central bank
ignores the intertemporal effects of monetary policy responses to supply shocks. Therefore the first
order condition for monetary policy is static:
( ) 0 2 = - +
T
t t t k y p p g (24)
The first order condition for the tax instrument is identical to (4), hence the open-loop rules for taxes
















p p - = (26)
The analysis of  debt policy requires a careful discussion. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997)
point out that delegation to an independent central bank induces strategic use of the debt policy, in
order to influence next period expected inflation while current inflation is taken as given. If expected15
future inflation is excessively high, the fiscal authority cuts down the amount of debt-financed
expenditures. This policy reduces future tax distortions and inflation expectations, but increases
current levels of taxes and inflation
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Next-period expected loss is obviously affected by the monetary policy regime. Observe that the
difference with the case of  full discretion arises because the policymaker correctly anticipates the
effects of his debt policy on future inflation but does not internalise the consequences for current
inflation.
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. From equation (2)
we know that:
1 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + - + + - = t t t t t g D r D g t (28)
Therefore, substituting the tax rule (25) into (28) and taking expected values we get:




















 we obviously need to define the inflation target.
Assumption 3. The inflation target is non-contingent
                                                       
15 Equations (25) and  (26) confirm that a fall in expenditures is matched by an increase in taxes.16
0 s         *
T T
s t ‡ " = + p p (30)
State-contingent targets would provide the flexibility necessary to optimise the transition to
steady state. However, the assumption that the inflation target is revised period by period is often
criticised. For instance, Beetsma and Jensen (1999) argue that if it is possible to adjust a target
before expectations are formed, it must also be possible to revise it later on, undermining the
credibility of the target. Thus, in the following  we analyse the performance of non-contingent
targets
16.
Substituting (30) into (27) we obtain:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) r 1
k 1 ?
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1 r
The fiscal policymaker now perceives that the target cannot affect the stochastic component
of the inflation bias and restrains his debt policy whenever expected inflation is too high and vice
versa.
Proposition 3. The choice of central bank preferences affects steady-state fiscal distortions if, in
each period, inflation is imperfectly controlled. A trade-off exists in the steady state between the
inflation bias and distortions. Complete elimination of the steady-state inflation bias increases
distortions relative to the case of  discretion  (Proof in Appendix III).
                                                                                                                                                                                       
16 In Appendix V we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of a state-contingent component into (30)17
The solutions for debt, expenditures and inflation are as follows:
( ) ( )
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where:
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in equation 32) is clearly
determined by the perceived impact of debt policy on next period loss. Relative to the case of
discretion (equation 10), the fiscal policymaker now restrains his debt policy in order to reduce the
future deviation of inflation from  p ~ . Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999b) show that in a two-period
model this has adverse effects in the short term, but are unable to investigate steady states.  By
extending their analysis to the infinite horizon, we find that strategic debt policy raises the volatility18
of the inflation bias (equation 38) but has long-term beneficial effects: distortions are reduced in
steady state
17 (equation 36) because  Q > Q* . A further reduction in steady-state distortions is
obtained if the central bank inflation target is larger than the socially optimal inflation rate. “Liberal”
central bankers – such that  1 < g and/or  p p ~ *>
T – induce the fiscal policymaker to restrain debt
accumulation in order to bring future expected inflation closer to the socially optimal level. This, in
turn, has beneficial effects on output distortions in steady state. Thus a trade-off exists between the
elimination of the inflation bias and the reduction in output distortions. By contrast, if the central
banker is target-conservative, as in Svensson (1997), steady state distortions increase. Specifically, if









p p - = (39)
the steady-state solution for public expenditures is obtained substituting (39) into (36)
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Proposition 4. For any given value of , strategic debt policy strengthens  * m  and the sensitivity of
public expenditures to shocks.
Once more, this happens because the fiscal policymaker anticipates the consequences of debt
policy on future inflation volatility, but neglects the implications for current inflation.
4.1 Optimal monetary institutions
                                                       
17 In the limiting case where  0 = g  the “inflation scare” induces the fiscal policymaker to keep debt at the socially
optimal level, therefore the inflation bias is eliminated in steady state. However the same inflation scare would inhibit
any fiscal response to shocks, hence this extreme case cannot achieve the first best.19
In our framework, the first-best is described by the non-distortionary steady state discussed in
Jensen (1994). To eliminate the inefficient accumulation of debt in steady state, it would be obvious
to advocate a constitutional constraint on fiscal policy – the endorsement of  a negative debt target.
However, as pointed out in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), in practice it may be difficult to adjust
the preferences of the fiscal policymaker and even constitutional constraints can at best mitigate the
adverse-incentives faced by the fiscal policymaker. For instance, the Maastricht Treaty requires that
EMU members pursue 60% debt-to-GDP target ratios, which are obviously far from solving the
issue discussed here. In this section we investigate the independent role of monetary institutions in
limiting fiscal distortions
18.  At this regard, optimal central bank design should minimise the expected
value of a loss function where political incentives do not matter, as in the following:
{ } { }
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The non-contingent inflation target and the degree of central bank aversion to inflation should
minimise (41), subject to (25), (33), (34), (36), (37) and (38).
Proposition 5. Optimal monetary institutions require that in steady state the Central bank tolerates
an inflation rate above the socially optimal level. A certain degree of central bank weight
conservatism is desirable to optimise policy responses to shocks (proof in Appendix IV).
Due to the nature of the loss function (41), it is never optimal to choose a corner solution
such as the complete elimination of the inflation bias in steady state.  The choice of  g  also affects
policy responses to shocks. In section 2.2 we have shown that political incentives lead to debt
                                                                                                                                                                                       
18 See the Appendix for a proof of the results discussed in this section.20
policies which are too timid and monetary policies which are too active. Setting  1 > g  would shift all
policy rules in the right direction.
Finally, we briefly discuss the role of state-contingent targets. Consider the following
formulation:
( ) 1 t t
2
1 T T
1 t g E
k
k
* + + + =
g
a p p (42)
The target is composed of two distinct terms. The first,  *
T p , is constant. The second,






a , is state dependent and implies that the target is conditional upon the current stock of
debt. The coefficient a  in (42) may be interpreted as the strength of the inflation target response to
the change in inflation expectations caused by debt policy.
Proposition 6.  If the inflation target in each period is conditional upon past debt levels, the
revision rule for the target should optimise the transition to the steady state, minimising the
variance of the inflation bias. To retain some influence on steady-state distortions, the socially
optimal inflation target should not completely sterilise the impact of current debt policy on future
inflation, as advocated in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999b)(Proof in Appendix V).
4.Conclusions
Popular models of  monetary policy games interpret institutional design as a means to remove
the inflation bias and to optimise policy responses to shocks.
We argue that a trade-off exists between inflation and fiscal distortions, therefore challenging
the view that monetary institutions should be designed to completely remove the inflation bias. In
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fact, our model assigns a more ambitious task to monetary institutions, and calls for a softer attitude
towards inflation. We believe that further research should apply this approach to the EMU case,
where fiscal policy is decentralised and each national policymaker retains some degree of flexibility in
the use of debt policy, regardless of the Stability and Growth Pact. Given our results, it is reasonable
to expect that ECB preferences should be adjusted to affect debt accumulation, conditional on the
game played by national fiscal authorities. This suggests that the emphasis on price stability should
be reconsidered.22
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Appendix I. Solution of the model following Jensen’s method
The Bellman equation is:















t D , t t , t p
1 - t D ßV D - D k p p k g k y
2
1
min D V E
~ ~   (A.1)
Inflation, taxes and the stock of debt carried over to the next period are the policy instruments.
Equation (A.1) is minimised subject to (1) and (2). Recall the first-order static conditions:
0
1 = + - t t g k y   (4)
( ) 0 ~
2 = - + p p t t k y (5)
which are obtained under the assumption that current tax and inflation decisions do not affect the
future state of the economy (Jensen 1994).
Using (1), (4) and (5) we get the open-loop solutions for taxes and expenditures:
t
e
t t t t g k





1 ~ - = p p (A.3)
Assuming rational expectations, from equation (A.3) we get







1 ~ - = = p p p (A.4)
Recall the intertemporal condition for debt policy:
( ) ( ) 0 1
~
1 1 3 1 = + - - + + t t t t g E r k D D k g k b  (9)
The latter implies that  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 + + - = t t t D g E r k D V .25
Forwarding (9) we obtain the optimal relationship between current and expected expenditures for
any future period:
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Using (2), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4)  equation (A.5) can be rearranged as:
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To obtain the closed-form solution for expenditures we impose the standard no  Ponzi-Game
condition:







The intertemporal budget constraint
19 is:
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+ + t t (A.8)
The solution for  t g is obtained substituting (A.2), (A.3), (A.4) and (A.6) into (A.8). Observe that if
( ) 1 1
2 < + b r , the discount factor  b  is so low that the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied
















                                                       
19 The term  G
r
r ~ 1+
appears in (A.8) because we have chosen to express current and future expenditures as deviations
from the target.26
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The steady state solution for debt (equation 12) is derived from (A.15). Substituting (12) into (A.13)
gives the steady state solution for public expenditures (equation 13). Then equations (A.13) and
(A.14) are easily rearranged to obtain (10) and (11).
Substituting (A.12) into (A.3) we obtain the monetary response to shocks  m ˆ  (equation 21). By the
same token (A.14) can be rearranged to obtain equation (20) under  m m ˆ = . We briefly comment on
the logic of this result. An adverse supply shock requires a tax reduction that drains resources
otherwise available for public spending. However, the tax reduction cannot entirely stabilise output,
because the policymaker must find a balance between the two conflicting goals of expenditures and
output stabilisation. As shown in (A.3) inflation reacts to output distortions which are proportional27
to the expenditures gap. Hence, the unanticipated fall in expenditures triggers an inflation surprise
that limits the output loss and the need to reduce taxes





 in equation (A.12) describes
how the inflation surprise weakens the impact of adverse supply shocks on expenditures and
ultimately on output. Equation (A.14) shows that monetary policy responses to shocks affect debt
dynamics through their impact on taxes. Therefore, the stochastic component of monetary policy
does affect the future state of the economy. This result is inconsistent with the assumption that debt
accumulation is invariant to current tax and inflation policies. In fact Jensen’s guess would be
confirmed only if one could obtain that  0 ˆ = m , when debt policy would react to shocks exactly as it
reacts to past accumulation of debt. Unfortunately this is not the case, therefore Jensen’s method is
unsuitable for the analysis of supply shocks.
Appendix II. Solution for m ~
To identify  m ~ (equation 22), we assume that that the monetary rule is defined as in equation (17).
Then we derive the value of m  that minimises the expected value of the policymaker’s loss function.
This is easily done taking the expected value of the loss function (3) 
21:
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From (1), (7), (11), (A.2), (A.3), (19) and assuming that the economy is in steady state
22, we obtain:
                                                       
20 Eq. (A.2) shows that any inflation surprise turns into a change in tax revenues.
21 The optimal policy rule is defined before shocks are observed. Such solution strategy is clearly inappropriate to
identify the systematic component of monetary policy because  it would obtain time-inconsistent policies. We use it
here because, by definition, the rational expectations constraint does not matter for the identification of  the monetary
response to supply shocks.
22 This assumption simplifies notation for the deterministic component of the welfare loss, but  is irrelevant for the
identification of  m ~.28
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It is straightforward to show that (22) minimises (A.17).
Appendix III. Solutions under a  non-contingent inflation target
Substituting equation (32) into (27) the intertemporal first order conditions becomes:
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
  0, s        ,
k 1
~ *
r 1 D ~ D
k
k


































Using (7), the intertemporal budget constraint (A.8) may be rewritten as
( ) ( ) ( ) t 1 - t s t
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where, from  (A.18),
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where:  ( ) [ ]
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Substituting (A.25) into (A.22) we get:
( )( ) [ ]






















Equations (A.25) and (A.26) may be rearranged as follows:
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
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Appendix IV. The optimal inflation bias is positive
In steady state the value of  (41) is
( )


























































































where  ss g  is defined in (36) and  ss p  is easily obtained from (36) and (38). We focus on the case
where the inflation target is the social planner’s control variable. Taking the first-order  derivative we
get
( )
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ] ( )
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( ) [ ]
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If the inflation target is determined according to (39), we obtain  0 ~ = -p p ss . From (40) we know









: it is never optimal to entirely remove the inflation
bias in steady state.
Appendix V.  Solutions under a state-contingent inflation target
If the target is defined as in (42), condition (A.18) becomes
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The solutions for debt, expenditures and inflation are as follows:
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where:
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. As a consequence (27)
is identical to (9), the inflation bias is entirely removed and the solutions for the expected levels of
expenditures, taxes and debt are the same as under discretion. However, for  1 0 < <a  the solutions
are qualitatively identical to those obtained under a non-contingent target. Observe that even if a32
state-contingent target is feasible, imperfect control of the inflation bias is necessary to obtain a
reduction of fiscal distortions in steady state.